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I. INTRODUCTION
A nonprofit corporation can be characterized as either a "public benefit"
organization or a "mutual benefit" organization.' Public benefit organiza-
tions, also referred to as charitable corporations or charities, exist to provide
a benefit to society.2 Mutual benefit organizations, often referred to as mem-
bership organizations, exist to provide a benefit to their members.' Florida,
like many states, uses a "one size fits all" approach to determine who has
standing to bring suit against directors of nonprofit corporations for breach of
fiduciary duties.4 That is, for both mutual benefit and public benefit non-
profit corporations, states restrict the parties who have standing to challenge
the actions of the directors on behalf of the corporation.' Standing is granted
1. JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 74 (3d ed. 2006).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 74-75.
4. See Fox v. Prof 1 Wrecker Operators of Fla., Inc., 801 So. 2d 175, 180 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 2001).
5. For example, the Georgia Nonprofit Corporations Code provides in relevant part:
A corporation's power to act may be challenged: (1) [i]n a proceeding by a member against the
corporation to enjoin the act; (2) [i]n a proceeding by the corporation, directly, derivatively, or
through a receiver, trustee, or other legal representative, against an incumbent or former direc-
tor, officer, employee, or agent of the corporation; or (3) [i]n a proceeding by the Attorney
General under Code Section 14-2-1430.
GA. CODE ANN. § 14-3-304(b)(l)-(3) (Supp. 2006). Similarly, the Connecticut Revised Non-
stock Corporation Act states in relevant part:
(b) A corporation's power to act may be challenged: (1) [i]n a proceeding by a member or di-
rector against the corporation to enjoin the act; (2) in a proceeding by the corporation, directly,
derivatively or through a receiver, trustee or other legal representative, against an incumbent or
former director, officer, employee or agent of the corporation; or (3) in a proceeding by the At-
torney General to dissolve the corporation or to enjoin the corporation from the conduct of un-
authorized affairs.
(c) In a member's or director's proceeding under subdivision (1) of subsection (b) of this section
to enjoin an unauthorized corporate act, the court may enjoin or set aside the act, if equitable
2
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only to members, directors, and legal representatives of the nonprofit corpo-
ration, as well as to the state's attorney general.6
In light of the distinctions between the two types of nonprofit corpora-
tions, this article proposes that the Florida Legislature include a standing
provision in the Florida Not for Profit Corporation Act7 that ensures that
directors, of both mutual benefit and public benefit nonprofit corporations,
are held accountable to all of the constituencies they serve. This article ar-
gues that Florida's current approach, while adequately protecting the inter-
ests of mutual benefit nonprofit corporations, does not achieve for many pub-
lic benefit nonprofit corporations its desired goal of protecting nonprofit cor-
porations from the harmful acts of directors. Florida's approach to standing
leaves the actions of directors of public benefit nonprofit corporations virtu-
ally untouchable and unchallengeable.8
This issue is especially timely given the recent approval of the Uniform
Trust Code,9 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, and Florida's subsequent adoption of it.' 0 The stated purpose of
the Uniform Trust Code is to "provide [s]tates with precise, comprehensive,
and easily accessible guidance on trust law questions."'" Because of a
settlor's special interest in a charitable trust, the drafters created section
405(c) of the Uniform Trust Code, which grants standing to a settlor of a
charitable trust to sue the trustees for breach of fiduciary duty. 2 Charitable
trusts and charitable corporations are both used to accomplish charitable pur-
and if all affected persons are parties to the proceeding, and may award damages for loss, other
than anticipated profits, suffered by the corporation or another party because of the enjoining of
the unauthorized act.
(d) the Attomey General may, upon his own information or upon complaint of an interested
party, bring an action in the name of the state to restrain any person from purporting to have, or
exercising, corporate powers not granted.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-1038(b)-(d) (West 2005).
6. See id.
7. See FLA. STAT. §§ 617.01011-.2103 (2006).
8. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 75-76.
9. UNIF. TRUST CODE (amended 2005).
10. See UTCproject.org, The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, http://utcproject.org (last visited Jan. 28, 2007).
The [United Trust Code] was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws (NCCUSL) in 2000. Minor amendments to the Code were made in 2001,
2003, 2004, and 2005. The [United Trust Code] has been enacted in 19 jurisdictions-Kansas,
Nebraska, Wyoming, New Mexico, District of Columbia, Utah, Maine, Tennessee, New
Hampshire, Missouri, Arkansas, Virginia, South Carolina, Oregon, North Carolina, and, re-
cently, Alabama, Florida, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. It is under study in numerous other states.
Id.
11. UNIF. TRUST CODE Prefatory Note (amended 2005).
12. Id. § 405 & cmt. "The settlor of a charitable trust, among others, may maintain a
proceeding to enforce the trust." Id. § 405(c).
20061
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poses. 13 Thus, given the similarities between the two, it is time for donors,
and others with a special interest in a charitable nonprofit corporation, to be
treated the same as their counterparts in the charitable trust arena and be
given a comparable right to enforce the fiduciary duties of the directors of
the corporation.
Part II of this article explains what it means for a corporation to be rec-
ognized as a Florida charitable, public benefit, nonprofit corporation. Part III
of the article explores the role of directors in Florida nonprofit corporations.
Part IV of the article discusses the current state of Florida law regarding who
has standing to bring suit for enforcement of the duties directors owe to non-
profit corporations. Part V of the article explains why Florida law must be
changed if mutual benefit and public benefit corporations are to be treated
similarly with respect to standing. Part VI of the article proposes that the
Florida Not for Profit Corporation Act include a private attorney general
provision which would allow those with a legitimate stake in the public
benefit nonprofit corporation to enforce the duties of the directors. The pro-
posal is based, in part, on the rationale used to grant standing to settlors in
the charitable trust area. Finally, Part VII of the article concludes by calling
for an amendment to the Florida Not for Profit Corporation Act which rec-
ognizes the special interests certain constituencies have in charitable corpora-
tions.
II. WHAT IS A CHARITABLE CORPORATION?
A corporation is a charitable corporation if it has been organized as a
nonprofit corporation under state law 4 and has complied with the require-
ments established by the Internal Revenue Code for charitable organiza-
tions.'5 Thus, the nonprofit corporate status of a charitable corporation is
determined by state law, while the charitable nature of the charitable corpo-
ration is established by federal law.
Complicating matters, the terms nonprofit and charitable are sometimes
used as if they are interchangeable. Charitable corporations are, however, a
subset of nonprofit corporations. 6 All charitable corporations are nonprofit
13. See MARILYN E. PHELAN & ROBERT J. DESIDERIO, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS LAW
AND POLICY 31 (2003).
14. Seeid.at30-31.
15. See id. at 169-71; Internal Revenue Serv., U. S. Dep't of the Treasury, Exemption
Requirements, http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/o,,id=96099,00.html (last visited
Jan. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Exemption Requirements].
16. See PHELAN & DESIDERIO, supra note 13, at 1.
[Vol. 31
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corporations, but not all nonprofit corporations are charitable. 7 While a
corporation may be a nonprofit corporation, its purpose need not be charita-
ble. " Nonprofit corporations are simply corporations that can be distin-
guished from for-profit corporations, primarily, on the basis of one fact: no
part of a nonprofit corporation's profits may be distributed to owners of the
corporation.' 9 Unlike for-profit corporations, nonprofit corporations must
reinvest any profits in the corporation.2"
The Florida Not for Profit Corporation Act is found in chapter 617 of
the Florida Statutes.2 Nonprofit corporations can be formed in Florida for
many different purposes. In fact, section 617.0301 of the Florida Statutes
includes a non-exclusive list of twenty-two permissible purposes for non-
profit corporations. 2' According to the statute, nonprofit corporations may
be organized for "charitable, benevolent, eleemosynary, 23 educational, his-
torical, civic, patriotic, political, religious, social, fraternal, literary, cultural,
athletic, scientific, agricultural, horticultural, animal husbandry, and profes-
sional, commercial, industrial, or trade association purposes. ' 24 The defining
characteristic of a Florida nonprofit corporation, like all nonprofit corpora-
tions, is that it does not distribute any part of its income or profit to members,
directors, or officers. 25 This characteristic distinguishes a nonprofit corpora-
tion from a for-profit or business corporation that may distribute its profits to
its owners in the form of dividends paid to shareholders.26
Charitable corporations are nonprofit corporations that have applied for
and received recognition from the Internal Revenue Service as having com-
plied with the requirements of section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code.27 In order for an organization to qualify for charitable status under
section 501(c)(3), five things must be true: 1) it must take the form of a cor-
poration, community chest, fund, or foundation; 2) it must be organized and
17. See id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 2. "Nonprofit organizations are not prohibited from making a profit. The pro-
hibition is against the distribution of any profits to members, officers, or directors of the or-
ganization, or to other private individuals or entities." Id.
20. See PHELAN & DESIDERIO, supra note 13, at 2.
21. FLA. STAT. §§ 617.01011-.2103 (2006).
22. Id. §617.0301.
23. Eleemosynary means "[rielating or devoted to charity." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
467 (5th ed. 1979).
24. FLA. STAT. § 617.0301.
25. Id. § 617.01401(5).
26. Compare id. § 607.06401(1), with § 617.01401(5).
27. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
2006]
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operated primarily for a charitable" purpose; 3) the net earnings of the or-
ganization may not inure to the benefit of a private person; 4) the organiza-
tion may not engage in a substantial amount of lobbying activities; and 5) the
organization must not be involved in any political campaigns. 29
A. Charitable Corporations Are Public Benefit Organizations
Corporations that satisfy both the requirements of chapter 617 of the
Florida Statutes and section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code are also
referred to as "public benefit" organizations. 30 The corporations are public
benefit organizations because they exist to provide a benefit to the public, or
to some segment of the public, and not to provide a benefit to their owners,
shareholders, members, or benefactors. 31  Historically, the goal of public
benefit organizations was to alleviate poverty by feeding the poor, housing
the homeless, caring for the elderly, tending to the sick, and engaging in
other activities that involved the provision of essential goods and services to
those who could not care for themselves.32 Over time however, the concept
of public benefit has expanded to also include other activities that provide a
benefit to society.33 The provision of education, both formal and informal,
support of religion, advancement of science, and the elimination of prejudice
and discrimination are all ways organizations can provide a benefit to soci-
ety.34 Additionally, organizations that promote the arts are considered public
benefit organizations.35 While the activities of these organizations may not
be charitable, as the term is traditionally understood, they enrich society in
ways that provide a benefit to the public.36 Thus, museums, symphonies, and
theater groups can be operated as charities. 3
28. Organizations that are recognized as having satisfied the requirements of section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code are commonly referred to as charitable organizations.
See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 74. In order to be considered a 501(c)(3) organiza-
tion, the purpose of the organization must be "religious, charitable, scientific, testing for pub-
lic safety, literary, . . . education[] .... foster[ing] national or international amateur sports
competition.... or the prevention of cruelty to children or animals." I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
29. See id. Throughout this paper, corporations that have been recognized as section
501 (c)(3) organizations will be referred to as charities or charitable organizations.
30. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 74.
31. Id. at 75.
32. See generally id. at 87-89 (discussing charitable purposes).
33. See id. at 89.
34. Exemption Requirements, supra note 15.
35. BRUCE R. HOPKINS, A LEGAL GUIDE TO STARTING AND MANAGING A NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATION 40 (2d ed. 1993) [hereinafter HOPKINS, A LEGAL GUIDE].
36. See id.
37. See id.
[Vol. 31
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B. Charitable Corporations Are a Subset of Tax Exempt Organizations
Charitable corporations are often referred to as tax exempt organiza-
tions because the income of these organizations is exempt from federal in-
come tax.38 The Internal Revenue Code provides that corporations are sub-
ject to an annual income tax.39 Charitable corporations, however, are exempt
from this tax pursuant to section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.4 ° In
addition to the exemption of the charity's income from federal income taxa-
tion, donors to certain charities are generally entitled to deduct the amount of
their charitable donations from the income on which they will have to pay
federal income tax.4' This deduction is available to donors to nonprofit or-
ganizations that are also recognized as section 501(c)(3) organizations, as
well as certain other tax exempt organizations. 42  However, donations to
most other types of tax exempt organizations are not deductible from the
donor's taxable income.4
3
Furthermore, Florida law provides preferential tax treatment to charita-
ble corporations in the areas of property, sales, use, and income taxes.'
Property owned by an exempt entity and exclusively used for "educational,
literary, scientific, religious, charitable, or governmental purposes" 41 is ex-
empt from Florida's property tax.46 Florida charities are also exempt from
paying state sales and use tax.47 Finally, the only taxable income earned by a
Florida charity is income that is derived from any commercial activity under-
taken by the charity that is unrelated to its charitable purpose. 48 Therefore,
38. I.R.C. § 501(a) (2000).
39. Id. § 11 (a). "A tax is hereby imposed for each taxable year on the taxable income of
every corporation." Id.
40. Id. § 501(a). "An organization described in [§ 501(c)(3)] shall be exempt from taxa-
tion...." Id.
41. I.R.C. § 170(a)(1). "There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable contribu-
tion .... " Id. The Internal Revenue Code limits the amount of the deduction to 50% or less
of the donor's taxable income. Id. § 170(b)(1)(A).
42. See id. § 170(c). The code also allows a donor donating to governmental bodies,
veterans' organizations, fraternal organizations, and cemetery companies to deduct the contri-
butions from the donor's adjusted gross income. Id.
43. See I.R.C. § 170(a) and (c).
44. See FLA. STAT. §§ 196.012, .192, 212.098(7)(k)-(q), 220.13(2)(h) (2006).
45. Id. § 196.012(1).
46. Id. § 196.192.
47. See id. § 212.08(7)(p). "Also exempt from the tax imposed by this chapter are sales
or leases to organizations determined by the Internal Revenue Service to be currently exempt
from federal income tax pursuant to s. 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code .... Id.
48. See FLA. STAT. § 220.13(2)(h). "'Taxable income,' in the case of an organization
which is exempt from the federal income tax by reason of s. 501(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code, means its unrelated business taxable income .. " Id.
2006]
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any income generated by the charitable activities of the organization-for
example, tuition charged for education-is not subject to Florida income
tax.49
The primary reason that charities and their donors are entitled to prefer-
ential tax treatment is that they provide a benefit to society. Charitable
corporations are thought to alleviate the burdens of government by providing
goods and services to the public that the government and for-profit organiza-
tions-two other types of societal institutions that provide goods and ser-
vices to the public--cannot, or will not, provide in sufficient quantities."
Governments may not be able to provide the goods or services because it
would not be efficient for government to do so. In addition, it may not be
appropriate for government to provide the goods and services if it would
involve entanglement with religion. For-profit organizations may not be
interested in providing many of the goods and services provided by charita-
ble corporations because there is no significant profit to be made by doing
so. 2 In exchange for the contributions they make to society-both by less-
ening the burdens of government and by increasing the quality of life of its
citizens-charities and their donors are treated favorably by state law and the
Internal Revenue Code. 
53
C. Charitable Corporations Distinguished from Mutual Benefit Corpora-
tions
Charitable corporations must be distinguished from mutual benefit non-
profit corporations. Rather than benefiting the public, mutual benefit corpo-
rations exist to provide a benefit to members of the organization. 4 Like
charitable nonprofit corporations, mutual benefit nonprofit corporations are
governed by chapter 617 of the Florida Statutes.55
Mutual benefit nonprofit corporations may be recognized as tax exempt
organizations for tax purposes as well. Section 501(c) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code delineates organizations, other than charities, whose income is
exempt from the federal income tax. 6 Business leagues, social clubs, labor
49. See id.
50. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 327-28 (discussing the rationale for chari-
table tax exemptions).
51. See id. at 43-44 (explaining the rationale for the nonprofit sector).
52. See id.
53. See id. at 327-28.
54. Id. at 74.
55. FLA. STAT. § 617 (2006).
56. I.R.C. § 501(c) (2000).
[Vol. 31
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organizations, and horticultural organizations are just a few of the different
types of organizations listed in section 501(c).57 Homeowners associations 8
and political organizations59 are also tax exempt organizations pursuant to
other sections of the Internal Revenue Code. Donations to mutual benefit tax
exempt organizations are not deductible from the donor's taxable income.6°
III. ROLE OF DIRECTORS IN NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS
A nonprofit corporation is governed by a board of directors.6' It is the
members of the board of directors who collectively guide the nonprofit cor-
62poration's operations. Perhaps most importantly, directors are charged
with knowing the purpose of the nonprofit corporation they serve and with
working within the law to achieve and maximize this purpose.63
A. Fiduciary Relationship
It is generally recognized that the relationship between the director of a
nonprofit corporation and the corporation is a fiduciary one. 64 As a result,
directors owe three major fiduciary duties to the charity. 65 The first duty is
the duty of obedience.66 According to this duty, directors of nonprofit corpo-
57. See id. Mutual benefit organizations listed in this section include: labor, agricultural
or horticultural organizations, business leagues, chambers of commerce, recreational clubs,
and fraternal beneficiary societies. Id.
58. See id. § 528.
59. See id. § 527.
60. See HOPKINS, A LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 35, at 30.
61. FLA. STAT. § 617.0801 (2006). "All corporate powers must be exercised by or under
the authority of, and the affairs of the corporation managed under the direction of, its board of
directors...." Id.
62. Id.
63. GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS 6 (George W. Overton &
Jeannie Carmedelle Frey eds., 2d ed. 2002).
64. Fox v. Prof I Wrecker Operators of Fla., Inc., 801 So. 2d 175, 180 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2001). See also 3 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 844.10 (2002).
65. BRUCE R. HOPKINS, LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF NONPROFIT BOARDS 2 (2003) [here-
inafter HOPKINS, LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES].
The duties of the board of directors of a nonprofit organization can be encapsulated in the three Ds:
[D]uty of care, duty of loyalty, and duty of obedience. Defined by case law, these are the legal stan-
dards against which all actions taken by directors are held. They are collective duties adhering to the
entire board and require the active participation of all board members. Accountability can be demon-
strated by showing the effective discharge of these duties.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
66. Id. at 4.
2006]
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rations must obey the articles of incorporation and the bylaws of the corpora-
tion, and remain faithful to the mission and goals of the corporation.67
The second duty, the duty of loyalty, requires the directors to act in the
best interest of the charitable corporation.68 This duty requires directors to
resolve any conflicts of interests with the corporation in favor of the corpora-
tion. 69 This duty also requires directors to avoid usurping opportunities that
the corporation may wish to obtain.7"
The duty of care is the third duty owed to the corporation by its direc-
tors.71 The duty of care requires directors to devote to the corporation the
time needed to actually manage its affairs. 72 It also requires directors to edu-
cate themselves about the issues facing the corporation and the consequences
of decisions they make on behalf of the corporation.73 In addition, the duty
of care imposes upon directors a responsibility to discover and expose any
acts that may inflict harm upon the corporation.74
B. Florida Statute Concerning Directors' Fiduciary Duties
Florida, like many other states, has codified the duty of care for direc-
tors of nonprofit corporations.75 Section 617.0830 of the Florida Statutes
provides:
(1) A director shall discharge his or her duties as a director, in-
cluding his or her duties as a member of a committee:
(a) In good faith;
(b) With the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
would exercise under similar circumstances; and
(c) In a manner he or she reasonably believes to be in the best in-
terests of the corporation.76
67. Id.
68. Id. at 3. See PHELAN & DESIDERIO, supra note 13, at 4-7.
69. See NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 191-197 (Victor Futter ed., 2002).
70. 1 MARILYN E. PHELAN, NONPROFIT ENTERPRISES: CORPORATIONS, TRUSTS, AND
ASSOCIATIONS § 4:06 (2000).
71. HOPKINS, LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 65, at 3.
72. See id.; GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, supra note 63, at
19.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. FLA. STAr. § 617.0830(1)(a)-(c) (2006); see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-33-830
(2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-1986 (1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 IB, § 8.30 (1997).
[Vol. 31
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This section, however, has only been cited a few times by Florida courts
ruling on disputes.77 Therefore, there is very little guidance available to de-
termine how it will be applied in particular situations.
C. Florida Case Law Concerning Directors'Fiduciary Duties
The vast majority of Florida cases involving the duties of directors of
nonprofit corporations involve non-charitable nonprofit corporations, spe-
cifically condominium and homeowners' associations." Careful analysis of
the relevant cases reveals that Florida courts treat the duties more broadly, as
fiduciary duties that involve obedience, loyalty, and care without identifying
or labeling them as such. 79  For example, in Penthouse North Ass'n v.
Lombardi, 80 the Supreme Court of Florida found that a condominium asso-
ciation could bring an action against its directors when the directors, who
also leased property to the nonprofit corporation, included a rent escalation
clause in the lease without informing the members of the association.8 The
Court recognized that directors who "us[e] their position[s] to enrich them-
selves at the expense of the [nonprofit corporation]" are in breach of their
fiduciary duties. 82 Likewise, in Taylor v. Wellington Station Condominium
Ass'n,83 the Court denied a director's motion for summary judgment when
members of the nonprofit condominium association alleged that the director
"acted solely at the urging of the developer in order to achieve financial
gain." 84 In Taylor, the director of the nonprofit corporation was also an offi-
cer of the for-profit developer of the condominium.85 In addition to alleg-
edly acting in the best interest of the developer, rather than in the best inter-
est of the condominium association, it was argued that the director never
attended the condominium association's board meetings.86 By denying the
76. FLA. STAT. § 617.0830(1)(a)-(c).
77. See, e.g., Fox v. Profl Wrecker Operators of Fla., Inc., 801 So. 2d 175, 180-81 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (concerning a civil case involving a breach of a fiduciary duty); State
v. Justice, 624 So. 2d 402, 404 n.8 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (concerning a criminal case
involving an alleged theft by a director of a nonprofit corporation).
78. See, e.g., Penthouse N. Ass'n, Inc. v. Lombardi, 461 So. 2d 1350, 1351 (Fla. 1984);
Taylor v. Wellington Station Condo. Ass'n Inc., 633 So. 2d 43, 44 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1994).
79. See generally Penthouse N. Ass'n, 461 So. 2d at 1350; Taylor, 633 So. 2d at 43.
80. 461 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1984).
81. Id. at 1352.
82. Id. at 1351.
83. 633 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
84. Id. at 44.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 44 n.l.
2006]
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director's motion for summary judgment, the Court found that the director's
actions and inactions could constitute a breach of fiduciary duties. 7
Two cases involving charitable nonprofit corporations also discuss gen-
erally directors' fiduciary obligations to their charities. 88 In State ex rel. But-
terworth v. Anclote Manor Hospital, Inc., 9 the court found that directors of a
nonprofit corporation had breached their fiduciary duties by selling the non-
profit corporation's assets-a hospital and two undeveloped parcels of
land-for less than fair market value to a for-profit corporation they
owned.9" While not describing these fiduciary breaches as breaches of the
duties of obedience, loyalty, and care, the court recognized that the directors
were acting in ways that were inconsistent with the nonprofit corporation's
articles of incorporation.91 Similarly, in Word of Life Ministry, Inc. v.
Miller,92 the court found that directors of a church were not entitled to sum-
mary judgment on a suit brought by the church and members of the congre-
gation for attempting to amend the bylaws of the church, a nonprofit corpora-
tion, in such a way that would allow them to dissolve the nonprofit corpora-
tion and take control of the church's assets. 93 The court found that a cause of
action had been stated for a breach of fiduciary duty by the directors and
stated that "[a] corporation must act in accordance with its articles of incor-
poration and duly adopted by-laws." 94 In addition, the court in Word of Life
Ministry, Inc. found that summary judgment was inappropriate when the
complaint alleged that the directors had "acted in furtherance of their own
personal interests rather than in the Church's best interests."95
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF DIRECTORS' DUTIES
When directors of a nonprofit corporation have breached their fiduciary
duties to the corporation, it is the corporation that is injured.96 The injury
87. Id. at 44-45.
88. See State ex rel. Butterworth v. Anclote Manor Hosp., Inc., 566 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Word of Life Ministry, Inc. v. Miller, 778 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2001).
89. 566 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
90. Anclote Manor Hosp., Inc., 566 So. 2d at 297.
91. Id. at 299. "The attorney general presented sufficient competent evidence to sustain
the trial court's finding that the appellee's improperly used the corporation's articles of incor-
poration when they sold the corporation's assets .... " Id. at 298-99.
92. 778 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
93. Word of Life Ministry, Inc., 778 So. 2d at 363-65.
94. Id. at 363.
95. Id. at 366.
96. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 176.
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results from assets or opportunities that belong to the corporation being mis-
used in a way that interferes with the corporation's ability to fulfill its mis-
sion.97 The harm may reduce the funds available to the corporation for use
in its operations because the directors have spent the money in ways that are
not
aligned with the corporation's purpose.9" The harm may also cause the cor-
poration to miss out on opportunities that are aligned with the corporation's
purpose because the directors have taken the opportunities for themselves.99
In addition to hurting the corporation financially, the injury may also harm
the corporation's reputation, making it more difficult for the corporation to
operate in the community.'° The corporation can only be protected if there
are individuals who are entitled to bring suit against the directors, on behalf
of the corporation, for the unlawful acts committed by the directors in the
name of the corporation.'
A. Florida Not for Profit Corporation Act Provisions Concerning Standing
Florida law grants standing only to a few specific individuals who chal-
lenge actions of directors that may constitute breaches of the nonprofit cor-
poration directors' fiduciary duties.0 2 Section 617.0304 of the Florida Stat-
utes provides in relevant part:
(2) A corporation's power to act may be challenged:
(a) In a proceeding by a member against the corporation to enjoin
the act;
97. See id at 176-79.
98. Id. at 176.
99. Id. at 205-06.
100. See, e.g., David Kidwell, Charity Director Used Funds for Personal Benefit, MIAMI
HERALD, Apr. 18, 2004, at Al. Camillus House, a Miami, Florida charity providing housing,
meals, medical, and rehabilitation services to the homeless, is an example of how a charity's
reputation can be damaged by the action or inaction of a board of directors. Id. In March
2004, Dale A. Simpson, the former executive director of Camillus House, was forced to resign
after he used the assets of the charity to renovate his own homes. Id. According to the Miami
Herald, "[b]lind trust and lax oversight" on the part of the board of directors allowed Mr.
Simpson to misuse the charity's funds. Camillus House Scandal Is a Wake-Up Call, MIAMI
HERALD, Apr. 20, 2004, at 24A. "The board must be deeply engaged in Camillus' inner work-
ings if it is to shore up public trust." Id.
101. See generally Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law,
Corporate Law, and Tax Law, 21 U. HAw. L. REV. 593 (1999) (analyzing the supervision of
charities and enforcement of fiduciary duties of charitable directors and trustees).
102. See FLA. STAT. § 617.0304 (2006).
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(b) In a proceeding by the corporation, directly, derivatively, or
through a receiver, trustee, or other legal representative, or through
members in a representative suit, against an incumbent or former
officer, employee, or agent of the corporation; or
(c) In a proceeding by the Attorney General, as provided in this
act, to dissolve the corporation or in a proceeding by the Attorney
General to enjoin the corporation from the transaction of unauthor-
ized business.
(3) In a member's proceeding under paragraph (2)(a) to enjoin an
unauthorized corporate act, the court may enjoin or set aside the
act, if equitable and if all affected persons are parties to the pro-
ceeding, and may award damages for loss (other than anticipated
profits) suffered by the corporation or another party because of en-
joining the unauthorized act. 103
In Florida, only members, directors, or legal representatives of a non-
profit corporation in a derivative suit, and the attorney general, have standing
to challenge a nonprofit corporation's power to act on behalf of the corpora-
tion.'04 In determining how the attorney general will be apprised of possible
fiduciary breaches by directors of nonprofit corporations, Florida Statutes
section 617.2003-Proceedings to Revoke Articles of Incorporation or Char-
ter or Prevent Its Use-states:
If any member or citizen complains to the Department of Legal
Affairs that any corporation organized under this act was organ-
ized or is being used as a cover to evade any of the laws against
crime, or for purposes inconsistent with those stated in its articles
of incorporation or charter, or that an officer or director of a corpo-
ration has participated in a sale or transaction that is affected by a
conflict of interest or from which he or she derived an improper
personal benefit, either directly or indirectly, and shall submit
prima facie evidence to sustain such charge, together with suffi-
cient money to cover court costs and expenses, the department
shall institute and in due course prosecute to final judgment such
legal or equitable proceedings as may be considered advisable ei-
ther to revoke the articles of incorporation or charter, to prevent its
improper use, or to recover on behalf of the corporation or its un-
103. Id. § 617.0304(2)-(3).
104. See id. § 617.2003.
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known beneficiaries any profits improperly received by the corpo-
ration or its officers or directors. 105
This provision codifies the practice which allows citizens of the state to
contact the Office of the Attorney General of Florida, also known as the De-
partment of Legal Affairs, 10 6 with concerns and questions about nonprofit
corporations. 10
B. Statutory Provisions Do Not Adequately Protect All Nonprofit Corpora-
tions
Section 617.2003 of the Florida Statutes appears to provide an avenue
for private citizens to ensure that directors of nonprofit corporations honor
their fiduciary duties.' However, the provision allows the Department of
Legal Affairs to exercise its discretion in determining which of the concerns
voiced by citizens will be pursued.'09 As a result, breaches of fiduciary du-
ties by directors may not be challenged if the Department of Legal Affairs
declines to exercise its discretionary authority."0 This may happen for a
number of reasons, including "[s]taffing problems and a relative lack of in-
terest in monitoring nonprofits.""' As a result, it has been said that "attor-
ney general oversight [is] more theoretical than deterrent.""' 2 Moreover,
Florida's Attorney General's office, unlike those in several other states," 3
has not created a separate charities section or unit to handle and coordinate
105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. Office of the Attorney General; Department of Legal Affairs,
http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/profiles/1026 (last visited Jan. 28, 2007).
107. See Florida Attorney General-Role and Function of the Attorney General,
http://myfloridalegal.com/overview (follow "Role and Function of the Attorney General"
hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 28, 2007). "Many Floridians look to the Office of the Attorney
General for guidance with disputes and legal issues. This agency receives hundreds of letters,
e-mails, phone calls, and visits each week about crime victims' compensation, divorce pro-
ceedings, abuse, possible consumer fraud, and other topics." Id.
108. See FLA. STAT. § 617.2003. The first sentence allows for any citizen to lodge a com-
plaint. Id.
109. See id. "[T]he [D]epartment shall institute and ... prosecute ... proceedings as may
be considered .. ." Id.
110. Id.
111. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 248.
112. Id.
113. See COUNCIL ON FOUNDS. & FORUM OF REG'L Ass'NS OF GRANTMAKERS,
GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF CHARITIEs-AN OVERVIEW 9 (2006),
http://www.givingforum.org/cgi-bin/doc_rep/public/file.pU/3666/regpuboverview.pdf (discuss-
ing how states like Pennsylvania, California, and Ohio have established charity sections in
their attorney general offices).
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charity oversight work, thereby increasing the likelihood that concerns about
fiduciary breaches will not be handled in a timely fashion, if ever." 4
C. Shortcomings of Florida's Approach
Florida's approach to standing to bring suit against directors of non-
profit corporations for breach of statutory duties does not achieve its desired
goals." 5 While adequately protecting the interests of a mutual benefit non-
profit corporation, this approach leaves the actions of directors of public
benefit nonprofit corporations virtually untouchable and unchallengeable. 6
When directors of a mutual benefit corporation, such as a country club,
homeowners' association, or labor union, breach their fiduciary duties, those
who are most affected by the breach-the members of the corporation-are
empowered by the Florida Statutes to bring suit against the directors on the
corporation's behalf.' This right, which has been granted to the members,
has been analogized to the right of shareholders of a for-profit corporation to
bring suit against its directors for breach of fiduciary duties in a derivative
action.18 In Larsen v. Island Developers, Ltd.,1"' members of the Fisher
Island Club, a nonprofit corporation that operated and maintained the resi-
dential condominium community facilities, brought a derivative action
against the corporation. O Reversing the trial court's dismissal of the mem-
bers' complaint, the court stated that the right of members to bring a deriva-
tive action on behalf of a nonprofit corporation comes from the common
law. "' According to the court, it is an equitable remedy that provides "relief
from 'faithless directors and managers. '' ' 122 Thus, even though the not-for-
profit corporation statute, in effect at that time, did not provide for derivative
actions against directors of nonprofit corporations, the common law did. 123
114. See Mary Grace Blasko et al., Standing to Sue in the Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F. L.
REv. 37, 47-49 (1993).
115. See, e.g., Fox v. Prof 1 Wrecker Operators of Fla., Inc., 801 So. 2d 175, 180 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2001). Though Florida recognizes standing for members of nonprofit corpora-
tions for breach of fiduciary duties, the directors of the nonprofit corporation are essentially
immune from civil liability. Id.
116. See id. at 180-82.
117. Larsen v. Island Developers, Ltd., 769 So. 2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2000).
118. Fox, 801 So. 2dat 180.
119. 769 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
120. Id. at 1071-72.
121. Id. at 1072.
122. Id. (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949)).
123. Larsen, 769 So. 2d at 1072.
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Likewise, in Fox v. Professional Wrecker Operators of Florida, Inc., 124 the
court found that members of nonprofit corporations should be treated simi-
larly to members of for-profit corporations with respect to derivative actions
"[b]ecause there is nothing about the remedy, which seeks redress for breach
of fiduciary duty, that warrants distinctive treatment based upon corporate
purpose." 1
25
However, the same is not true when the directors of a public benefit
nonprofit corporation breach their fiduciary duties. 126 In this instance, it is
not the members of the corporation that are directly affected by a fiduciary
breach by directors; rather, it is the donors to the corporation, whose money
is being misused, or the employees and volunteers whose workplace has
been impacted, who are most directly affected. 127 Unlike the mutual benefit
corporation scenario, those who are most affected by the nonprofit corpora-
tion's failure to act as intended are not granted the right to challenge the ac-
tions of the directors on the corporation's behalf. 128
Florida's "one size fits all" approach to standing-lumping together
both mutual benefit and public benefit organizations 129-fails to recognize
that many public benefit nonprofit corporations do not have members who
are empowered to act on behalf of the corporation when directors abuse their
position. 3 ° Charities are unlike country clubs, homeowners associations, or
business leagues that are comprised of members who benefit from the non-
profit corporation's activities. 31 Public benefit organizations, by definition,
benefit the public or some undefined segment of the public. '32
In addition, while section 617.0304 of the Florida Statutes grants stand-
ing to directors to bring suit on behalf of the corporation when the directors
breach their fiduciary duties, '3 it is unlikely that directors will authorize
124. 801 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
125. Id. at 180.
126. FLA. STAT. § 617.0304(2)(a). Because the statute only grants standing to a "member"
of the corporation, this effectively leaves public benefit nonprofit corporations without mem-
bers as immune. Id.
127. See Victor B. Flatt, Notice and Comment for Nonprofit Organizations, 55 RUTGERS L.
REv. 65, 67-69 (2002).
128. See FLA. STAT. § 617.0304(2)(a).
129. See id. § 617.0301; Fox, 801 So. 2d at 180.
130. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 76.
131. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 249 (8th ed. 2004). Charitable organizations are
"operated exclusively for... community-service purposes [and do] not distribute earnings for
private individuals." Id.
132. FISHMAN & SCHWARtZ, supra note 1, at 76.
133. FLA. STAT. § 617.0304.
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potentially embarrassing litigation to be brought against them.'34 Thus,
unless the Florida statute is changed, those who wish to challenge the acts of
charitable corporations in Florida are at the mercy of the Florida Attorney
General when seeking recovery, when directors misuse their positions.
V. WHY FLORIDA SHOULD CHANGE THE STANDING PROVISION IN THE
FLORIDA NOT FOR PROFIT CORPORATION ACT
A. Florida Should Provide Equal Access to Derivative Actions to Public
Benefit and Mutual Benefit Nonprofit Corporations
Florida courts have stated-in cases involving mutual benefit corpora-
tions-that there is no reason to treat nonprofit corporations differently than
for-profit corporations, when it comes to derivative actions.135 Since the
purpose of derivative actions is to permit redress for "rights of action that
belong to corporations that have been injured by the acts of the corporations'
officers and directors,"' 3 6 the not-for-profit corporation statute must ensure
that it is possible for this to happen when both mutual benefit and public
benefit nonprofit corporations have been injured. The statute accomplishes
this goal for mutual benefit nonprofit corporations by allowing members of
the corporation to bring suit when the directors have breached their fiduciary
duties. '37 The members have a vested interest in the purpose of the nonprofit
corporation, and it is appropriate that they can act on behalf of the corpora-
tion when the directors act contrary to that purpose.
The statute does not, however, provide the same redress when the cor-
poration is a public benefit nonprofit corporation.' 38 Even though there are
individuals with a vested interest in the public benefit corporation's purpose,
because there are often no members of the corporation,' 39 there is no one
with standing to enforce the rights of the corporation.' 40 The goal of deriva-
tive actions, however, is to give those with a legitimate stake in the corpora-
134. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS
AND CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS § 8.12 (1996). Professor Hamilton makes the same argu-
ment about shareholders and actions against for-profit corporations. Id
135. See supra text accompanying notes 75-78; see, e.g., Fox v. Prof'l Wrecker Operators
of Fla., Inc., 801 So. 2d 175, 180 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Larsen v. Island Developers,
Ltd., 769 So. 2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
136. Timko v. Triarsi, 898 So. 2d 89, 90 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Provence v.
Palm Beach Taverns, Inc., 676 So. 2d 1022, 1024 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
137. See FLA. STAT. § 617.0304 (2006).
138. Id. § 617.0304 (2)(a).
139. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 76.
140. See FLA. STAT. § 617.0304.
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tion standing to act on the corporation's behalf.' Courts have held that
members have a legitimate stake in mutual benefit corporations. 14 2 Who has
a legitimate stake when the corporation is a public benefit corporation?
B. Florida Should Protect Charitable Corporations and Charitable Trusts
Similarly
Charitable organizations are generally organized as either charitable
corporations or charitable trusts. "' Even though charitable corporations are
as similar to charitable trusts as they are to for-profit corporations,'" the
organizational structure determines the law that governs the charity. '45 Flor-
ida has chosen to apply the principles of corporate law to charitable corpora-
tions. 46 Therefore, the Florida Not for Profit Corporation Act, 17 resembles
the Florida Business Corporation Act, 48 and not the Florida Trust Code,'49
when determining who has standing to bring suit, when directors of charita-
ble corporations breach their fiduciary duties. "'
The law concerning standing may have been drafted differently if Flor-
ida had chosen to borrow from trust law, instead of corporate law. In Dela-
ware ex rel. Gebelein v. Florida First National Bank of Jacksonville, 5' the
First District Court of Appeal of Florida explained standing for enforcement
of charitable trusts as follows:
As a general rule, only the Attorney General may enforce a chari-
table trust. Unlike a private trust, where there are identifiable
beneficiaries who are the equitable owners of the trust property,
the beneficiaries of a charitable trust are the public at large.
Whereas beneficiaries of a private trust have the power to maintain
141. Timko, 898 So. 2d at 90-91.
142. See, e.g., Fox v. Prof'I Wrecker Operators of Fla., Inc., 801 So. 2d 175, 180 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Larsen v. Island Developers, Ltd., 769 So. 2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 2000).
143. See PHELAN & DESIDERIO, supra note 13, at 27-28, 30.
144. See id. at 27-32 (discussing organizational structures of nonprofit organizations).
145. See id. at 1-8.
146. Samuel W. Braver et al., No Trespassing: Donors Lack Legal Standing to Challenge
Corporate Acts of Florida Not-for-Profit Corporations, 75 FLA. B.J. 50, 50 (Dec. 2001).
147. FLA. STAT. §§ 617.01011-.2103 (2006).
148. Id. §§ 607.0101-.193.
149. Florida Trust Code of 2006, ch. 2006-217, § 736.0405(3) (to be codified at FLA.
STAT. § 736).
150. See FLA. STAT. § 617.0304.
151. 381 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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a suit to enforce the trust, the public must act through some public
official to maintain such a suit. 
152
The court continued:
However, it has been recognized that an entity other than the At-
torney General can be a proper party to bring suit to enforce a
charitable trust. Trustees have been permitted to bring suit against
co-trustees, and persons or organizations having a special interest
in a trust or a special status under a trust instrument are considered
to have standing to enforce the trust.
153
Under Florida corporate law, the attorney general and trustees are em-
powered to bring suit against trustees for breach of fiduciary duties.'54
Moreover, those with a "special interest" in a trust or a "special status" under
a trust instrument can bring suit to enforce a charitable trust.'55 In Gebelein,
the court found that the Attorney General of Delaware, as the lawful repre-
sentative of the citizens of Delaware, had standing to challenge the actions of
the trustees of the DuPont Trust. 5 6 According to the trust instrument, "the
net income of the trust was to be paid... to the Nemours Foundation 'for the
purpose of maintaining "Nemours" as a charitable institution for the care and
treatment of crippled children, . . first consideration, in each instance, being
given to beneficiaries who are residents of Delaware."",157 The Florida court
found that the citizens of Delaware had a special interest in enforcement of
the trust because they had a special status not shared with the public at
large. 158
Additionally, Florida is one of the nineteen states that has enacted the
Uniform Trust Code.'59 Section 736.0405 of the Florida Statutes recognizes
the special interest of settlors in ensuring that the assets of the charitable
trusts they create are used to fulfill a charitable purpose. 1"0 Because there are
those with a special interest or a special status, with respect to a charitable
corporation, just as there are those with such an interest or status, with re-
152. Id. at 1077.
153. Id. (citing RONALD CHESTER ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 412-14
(2005); EDITH L. FISCH ET AL., CHARITIES AND CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS §§ 713, 718-19
(1974); 4 AUSTIN WAKEMAN ScoTr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 391 (3d ed. 1967)).
154. FLA. STAT. § 617.0304.
155. Gebelein, 381 So. 2d at 1077.
156. Id. at 1078.
157. Id. at 1076.
158. Id. at 1078.
159. UTCproject.org, supra note 10.
160. FLA. STAT. § 736.0405 (2006).
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spect to a charitable trust, those corporate individuals should also have stand-
ing to enforce the directors' duties. 161
VI. THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL DOCTRINE
In order to fully protect the interests of charitable nonprofit corpora-
tions, the Florida Not for Profit Corporation Act should be amended to in-
clude a private attorney general provision for public benefit corporations.
A. What Is the Private Attorney General Doctrine?
The private attorney general concept dates back to at least 1943, when
the court, in Associated Industries of New York State, Inc. v. Ickes, 62 used
the term private attorney general to refer "to plaintiffs empowered by Con-
gress to 'su[e] to prevent action by an officer in violation of his statutory
powers ... even if the sole purpose is to vindicate the public interest."",1
63
The term has come to encompass much more than the right to sue a public
officer.164 For example, Florida recognizes that the private attorney general
theory is used when private attorneys bring suit for violation of civil
rights. 65 In Wesley Group Home Ministries, Inc. v. City of Hallandale,66 a
case involving the Fair Housing Act, the Florida court stated that "[i]n civil
rights laws, Congress uses the private attorney general concept as a vehicle
for vindicating social policies of the highest priority." '167 The common thread
that runs through private attorney general actions is that the lawsuit involves
more than just redress for a private injury. 68 Rather, the private attorney
general theory applies when the injury is to the public, or when the acts of
the potential defendant run contrary to some important public policy.
169
Such actions also allow for a remedy that protects the public and the public
161. See Blasko et al., supra note 114, at 37 (analyzing standing to sue charitable trusts
and corporations for mismanagement, fraud, and corruption).
162. 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943).
163. Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First Amendment, 103
MICH. L. REv. 589, 590 n.1 (2005) (quoting Ickes, 134 F.2d at 704).
164. See Wesley Group Home Ministries, Inc. v. City of Hallandale, 670 So. 2d 1046,
1050 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
165. See id.
166. Id. at 1046.
167. Id. at 1050 (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)).
168. Morrison, supra note 163, at 590. "At its core, however, the term denotes a plaintiff
who sues to vindicate public interests not directly connected to any special stake of her own."
Id.
169. See id. at 598.
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policy, rather than just compensating a private individual for injury. 70 The
private attorney general theory is not appropriate when there is only an injury
to a single person because in that instance, it would be appropriate for the
injured party to retain an attorney to seek redress for the injury. 171
B. Potential Plaintiffs Under the Private Attorney General Doctrine
When directors of public benefit corporations breach their fiduciary du-
ties, it is the corporation that is injured.'72 In addition, the public is injured
because public benefit corporations exist to provide a benefit to the public. 
73
Because public benefit corporations generally do not have members, there
are no private individuals who are entitled to bring suit for enforcement of
those duties. 174 A private attorney general provision in the Florida Not for
Profit Corporation Act would grant standing to certain private individuals
that would enable them to act on behalf of the corporation."' The provision
would not grant standing generally to members of the public.176 Rather, the
provision would recognize that there are those with a legitimate stake or spe-
cial interest in the corporation who are entitled to act on behalf of the corpo-
ration. '77
In order to have a legitimate stake or special interest in a public benefit
nonprofit corporation that would confer standing, an individual must have an
interest or stake in the charity that exceeds any general interest possessed by
the public at large. '78 The individual must have a more intimate relationship
with the charity, such that it would be appropriate for that individual to serve
as a watchdog over the charity. 179  Three categories of individuals-
substantial donors, key employees and volunteers, and potential beneficiar-
ies-shall be considered in turn.
170. See id.
171. See William B. Rubenstein, On What a "Private Attorney General" Is-And Why It
Matters, 57 VAND. L. REv. 2129, 2171 (2004). "[Plrivate attorneys general are persons who
mix public and private functions in the adjudicative arena .. ." Id.
172. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 76.
173. See PHELAN & DESIDERIO, supra note 13, at 2.
174. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 75-76.
175. See Morrison, supra note 163, at 590.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See id. at 622-27.
179. See id.
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1. Substantial Donors
Section 736.0405 of the new Florida Trust Code explicitly grants, for
the first time, standing to enforce a charitable trust to the trust's settlor. 8 0
The statute continues the common law rule that charitable trusts are enforce-
able by the state attorney general, as well as others with a special interest in a
trust, including co-trustees. 8 ' The Florida Trust Code defines a settlor as "a
person, including a testator, who creates or contributes property to a trust."'
' 82
Thus, in order to protect charitable corporations and charitable trusts simi-
larly, the Florida Not for Profit Corporation Act should also allow those who
create or contribute property to a charitable corporation to sue the directors
for breach of fiduciary duty. However, in order to ensure that not everyone
who makes a contribution to a charity will have standing to sue the charity, a
private attorney general provision would only grant standing to "substantial"
donors. The provision could define a substantial donor as one who has con-
tributed at least twenty percent of the charity's revenue in the year or years
of the action or actions to be challenged. This requirement would protect
directors from having to defend themselves in lawsuits brought by those with
virtually no interest in the corporation, while recognizing the significant con-
tribution the substantial donor has made to the charitable corporation '
83
Allowing a substantial donor to have standing to sue directors for
breach of fiduciary duties serves several beneficial purposes.'1 4  First, it
serves to alleviate the burden on the attorney general's office of policing the
fiduciary duties of all Florida charitable organizations. 181 Substantial donors
would likely keep a watchful eye on the continuing operations of their cho-
sen charitable organizations. Granting standing to such concerned individu-
als or entities would perhaps enable the donors to catch a breach early
enough to avert a catastrophic result to the charity.
Second, charitable organizations attempting to seek substantial contri-
butions from prospective donors would benefit from a law granting such
180. Florida Trust Code of 2006, ch. 2006-217, § 736.0405(3) (to be codified at FLA.
STAT. § 736). The effective date of the new Florida Trust Code is July 1, 2007. Id. § 49.
181. Delaware ex rel. Gebelein v. Fla. First Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville, 381 So. 2d 1075,
1077 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
182. Ch. 2006-217, § 736.0103(16); see also FLA. STAT. § 731.201(17) (2006).
183. See John T. Gaubatz, Grantor Enforcement of Trusts: Standing in One Private Law
Setting, 62 N.C. L. REV. 905, 914-15 (1984); see also Ronald Chester, Grantor Standing to
Enforce Charitable Transfers Under Section 405(c) of the Uniform Trust Code and Related
Law: How Important Is It and How Extensive Should It Be?, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
611, 629-35 (2003).
184. See Morrison, supra note 163, at 608 & n.82.
185. Id.
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donors standing. The charitable organizations could point to this right in
discussions with prospective donors who otherwise might insist on difficult
and confining contractual limitations on the use of their donated funds. 
186
2. Employees and Volunteers
This portion of the attorney general provision of the statute would also
provide a status akin to employees' whistle-blower status and regular volun-
teers of the charity.' 87 Often, employees and volunteers, those who are in-
volved in the day-to-day operations of the charity, have a front row seat to
abuses by directors. The statute could grant a special status to these indi-
viduals, so long as they were employees or volunteers at the time of the al-
leged breaches and witnessed, or otherwise had first-hand knowledge of the
directors' breaches of fiduciary duties, giving them standing to sue the direc-
tors on behalf of the corporation.'88
3. Beneficiaries and Potential Beneficiaries
While it is tempting to advocate that beneficiaries and potential benefi-
ciaries be recognized as having standing to bring suit on behalf of the chari-
ties from which they benefit against the directors who are misusing the chari-
ties, these individuals may constitute a group that is too amorphous and un-
defined to be manageable. The beneficiaries of a charitable corporation are
by definition unidentifiable, and while it may be possible to identify current
beneficiaries of a particular charity, current beneficiaries eventually become
former beneficiaries. '89 Students graduate from school, homeless people find
homes, hospitals discharge patients, and symphony patrons move to new
186. See Iris J. Goodwin, Donor Standing To Enforce Charitable Gifts: Civil Society vs.
Donor Empowerment, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1093, 1143 (2005).
187. See 10-259 Lab. & Emp. Law (MB) § 259.04 (2006), http://Ilexis.com (follow "Mat-
thew Bender" hyperlink; then follow "By Area of Law" hyperlink; then follow "Labor &
Employment Law" hyperlink; search "259.04"; then follow "Part IX General Employment
Law" hyperlink). Whistle blower status protects "employees who report, or threaten to report,
[or object to employer] wrongdoing" from retaliatory job actions. Id.
188. FLA. STAT. § 112.3187(2) (2006). Florida's Whistle-blower's Act is intended:
to prevent agencies or independent contractors from taking retaliatory action against an em-
ployee who reports to an appropriate agency violations of law on the part of a public employer
or independent contractor that create a substantial and specific danger to the public's health,
safety, or welfare. It is further the intent of the Legislature to prevent agencies or independent
contractors from taking retaliatory action against any person who discloses information to an
appropriate agency alleging improper use of governmental office, gross waste of funds, or any
other abuse or gross neglect of duty on the part of an agency, public officer, or employee.
Id.
189. Gary, supra note 101, at 616; Braver et al., supra note 146, at 50.
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cities. However, it is possible that certain beneficiaries have stakes in the
corporation that are legitimate enough that they should be granted standing to
sue for breach of fiduciary duties by the directors.'90 Therefore, the statute
should provide that: 1) Current beneficiaries of a charitable corporation at
the time of the alleged breach of fiduciary duty have standing to sue on be-
half of the corporation; and 2) when the class of potential beneficiaries is
sharply defined, any of those potential beneficiaries has standing to sue on
behalf of the corporation. For example, students who are members of a class
from which a charitable corporation is to select scholarship recipients would
have standing to sue if the directors breach their fiduciary duties.
C. Fundamental Principle Underlying Private Attorney General Doctrine
Determining who should have standing to enforce the fiduciary duties
of charitable corporation directors is difficult and bright line rules are always
subject to scrutiny. However, the fundamental, conceptual principle is clear:
The plaintiff must be distinguishable from members of the general public so
that it is appropriate for the individual to act on behalf of the corporation. 191
There must be a nexus between the potential plaintiffs interest in the charity
and the alleged breach of fiduciary duty.' 92 The potential plaintiff must have
an interest in the charity that is related to the alleged breach of duty.' 93 Do-
nors, employees, volunteers, and certain beneficiaries all have interests in the
charity that require the directors to act in ways that do not harm the char-
ity.'94 When directors misuse the charity's assets or opportunities, donors,
employees, volunteers, and beneficiaries are affected in ways that are differ-
ent than any effect that may be felt by general members of the public.' 95
190. See Alco Gravure, Inc. v. Knapp Found., 479 N.E.2d 752, 756 (N.Y. 1985). In this
case, the Knapp Foundation, a charitable corporation, established to provide assistance to the
employees of specified companies and their families, amended its certificate of incorporation
to allow it to distribute principal and income of the Foundation to other charitable organiza-
tions. Id. at 754. The court, in holding that the employees had standing to challenge the
amendment, stated:
The general rule is that one who is merely a possible beneficiary of a charitable trust, or a
member of a class of possible beneficiaries, is not entitled to sue for enforcement of the trust..
. There is an exception to the general rule, however, when a particular group of people has a
special interest in funds held for a charitable purpose, as when they are entitled to a preference
in the distribution of such funds and the class of potential beneficiaries is sharply defined and
limited in number.
Id. at 755.
191. See Blasko et al., supra note 114, at 55, 70.
192. Id. at 74
193. Id.
194. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 75-76.
195. See Blasko et al., supra note 114, at 70-71.
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Donors, whose money has been misspent, employees and volunteers, who
can no longer perform their jobs effectively, and beneficiaries, who cannot
receive the goods or services they need, suffer and are affected by the breach
in a way that is related to, but separate from the injury suffered by the char-
ity. Similarly, the potential plaintiff must have an interest in ensuring that
the charity fulfills its charitable mission in a way that can be distinguished
from the interest of the general public. '96 While public benefit organizations
benefit the public generally by lessening the burdens on government, and
improving the quality of life for society as a whole, there are those who are
more intimately connected with a charity's charitable purpose.' 97 Donors,
who have contributed money to further the charitable purpose, employees
and volunteers, who give their time to further the charitable purpose, and
beneficiaries, who receive the fruits of the charity's labor, have a greater
interest in the charity's fulfillment of its charitable purpose than members of
the public generally.
D. Remedy Available Under Private Attorney General Doctrine
The purpose of the private attorney general theory is to protect the char-
ity-not to compensate any individual for harms they may have received as a
result of a breach of fiduciary duty. 198 Thus, the remedies available under
the statute will be those designed to restore the charity to the state it was in
before the breach. '99 Directors who have acted in ways inconsistent with the
fiduciary duties that they owe to the corporation will be required to return to
the charity any assets or opportunities taken from the charity.2 °0 In addition,
the charity may be entitled to equitable relief intended to enjoin the directors
from acting in ways that will harm the charity.20' Further, in appropriate
instances, the court may even remove directors from the board or in the most
egregious situations, dissolve the corporation.2 2 There is the risk that a pri-
vate attorney general provision in the Florida Not for Profit Corporation stat-
ute will make it more difficult for charitable corporations to find individuals
196. Id. at 70-72.
197. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 76.
198. See Morrison, supra note 163, at 590. "The remedies sought in such actions tend to
be correspondingly broad: rather than seeking redress for discrete injuries, private attorneys
general typically request injunctive or other equitable relief aimed at altering the practices of
large institutions." Id.
199. See Rubenstein, supra note 171, at 2141.
200. Id.
201. Morrison, supra note 163, at 590.
202. See FLA. STAT. § 617.1430 (2006).
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willing to serve as directors.2"3 However, the private attorney general provi-
sion will not alter any protections for directors already built into the Not For
Profit Corporation Act.20 4
E. Attorney's Fees Under the Private Attorney General Doctrine
Private attorney general statutes often provide for attorney's fees for
successful litigation." 5 The doctrine has been described as one that allows
for the award of attorney's fees "to a party who vindicates a right that: (1)
benefits a large number of people; (2) requires private enforcement; and (3)
is of societal importance. 2 0 6 The private attorney general statute this article
proposes would not generally allow for attorney's fees.20 7 Unlike, for exam-
ple, the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, which allows the
prevailing party to recover attorney's fees,20 8 the private attorney general
provision in the Not for Profit Corporation Act would only do so in very
limited circumstances.0 9
The purpose of allowing private individuals to bring suit for directors'
breaches of fiduciary duty is to protect the charity. 0 That is, directors
should be required to disgorge any benefit they received at the expense of the
charity and return it to the charity.2"' If the prevailing party were entitled to
attorney's fees from the corporation, as is the case with the attorney's fees
when shareholders prevail in derivative actions,22 it is possible the charity
would end up paying more in attorney's fees than the charity would recover
203. See id.
204. See id. § 617.0834(1)(b)(1)-(3). The Florida Statute provides for immunity from civil
liability for directors who have not acted criminally, derived an improper personal benefit, or
who have not acted recklessly, in bad faith, with a malicious purpose, or in a manner demon-
strating wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property. Id.
205. See Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Private Attorney General Doctrine-State Cases,
106 A.L.R.5TH 523 (2003).
206. Id.
207. Contra FLA. STAT. § 501.2105(1) (2006).
208. Id.
209. Id. § 501.2105(5).
210. See Gary, supra note 101, at 596.
211. See id.
212. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 607.07401(6).
The court may award reasonable expenses for maintaining the proceeding, including reason-
able attorney's fees, to a successful plaintiff or to the person commencing the proceeding who
receives any relief, whether by judgment, compromise, or settlement, and require that the per-
son account for the remainder of any proceeds to the corporation; however, this subsection
does not apply to any relief rendered for the benefit of injured shareholders only and limited to
a recovery of the loss or damage of the injured shareholders.
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from the breaching directors. Instead, the American Rule" 3 regarding attor-
ney's fees would apply and private attorneys and legal clinics would be en-
couraged to take up these cases on a pro bono basis. If, however, a director
is found to have breached his or her fiduciary duties, and also either: 1) vio-
lated the criminal law; 2) received an improper personal benefit; or 3) acted
recklessly, in bad faith, with a malicious purpose, or in a manner demonstrat-
ing wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property, that
director will be responsible for the prevailing party's attorney's fees.21 4 In
addition, a nonprofit corporation will not be permitted to indemnify a direc-
tor in such a case.21 s
The private attorney general provision in the Florida Not for Profit Cor-
poration Act is intended for use in only the most serious cases-when none
of the directors of the charity is willing to bring suit on behalf of the charity
and when the attorney general's office is unwilling to pursue the claim.216
By providing for attorney's fees only when the directors have acted particu-
larly egregiously, 217 the provision will discourage frivolous and vexatious
litigation.
VII. CONCLUSION
A private attorney general provision in nonprofit corporation acts that
treats public benefit and mutual benefit corporations similarly with regards to
standing will ensure that charitable nonprofit corporations provide the public
benefits they were created to provide. By providing a mechanism that allows
those who are most invested in the corporation to enforce the fiduciary duties
the directors owe to the corporation, the private attorney general provision
will allow private individuals to assist the attorney general in maintaining a
watchful eye over corporations that were granted the privilege of operating in
the State of Florida based on the benefits they promised to provide to the
public. In addition, the provision will prevent charitable corporations from
misusing their corporate charters by encouraging directors to live up to their
fiduciary responsibilities. A private attorney general provision that is not a
213. Black's Law Dictionary explains the American Rule as providing "that attorney fees
are not awardable to the winning party unless statutorily or contractually authorized."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 75 (5th ed. 1979).
214. This language is borrowed from the provision of Florida's Not for Profit Corporation
Act regarding personal liability of directors of nonprofit corporations. FLA. STAT. §
617.0834(l)(b)(l)-(3).
215. This does not change the indemnification provision in the Florida Not for Profit Cor-
poration Act. See id. §§ 617.0831, 607.0850.
216. See supra Part VI.D.
217. See supra Part VI.E.
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"one size fits all" provision will further the state's interest in protecting its
citizens by holding directors of charitable corporations accountable to the
corporations they serve.
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